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# The Classical Weekly

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## LIFE VERSUS A LIVING

To one who has grown used to finding flings at the Classics almost everywhere, even in the short stories in cheap magazines, it is a pleasure to run across, unexpectedly, in such quarters, some utterance friendly to the Classics. Such utterances there are in a story in *The Saturday Evening Post*, for October 25, 1919. The story, by Frederick Orin Bartlett, is entitled *The Junior Member*, and is to be found on pages 14-15, 158, 161-162. It has to do with the history of a certain Jim Cousens, who in his Freshman year at College eloped with a girl from a nearby Preparatory School. Cousens and his wife dream their dreams of the things their son and their daughter are to do in College; the children are to enjoy the advantages which the parents had sacrificed first for their love and then for their children. To this end the parents laid aside \$3,000 for the education of their daughter, and \$5,000 for the education of their son. But the daughter imitated her mother's example, and married early and abruptly, and the son went into business, because as he put it, "four years after high seems a long time to put into school". Their dreams shattered in this way, Cousens lost interest in life, until his son practically forced him to take a vacation. This vacation he spent at Cambridge, and presently he entered College as a Freshman, while his wife resumed her study of music, which had been interrupted by her early marriage. In four years Cousens won both a B.A. and an M.A. He then returned to New York, and for a time watched the course of his son's business, noting that his son and his partner, in spite of their apparent success, lacked vision; in a word, as the result of his College training, gained after he was forty years of age, Cousens was able to see in the business what his son had been unable to see in it in over twenty years of devotion to it. When the father received an offer of \$5,000 per year to return as head clerk to the bank in whose service he had been while he had dreamed the dreams for his son and his daughter, the son, who had once thought his father slow, admitted like a man to his father that the father's view of the son's business was wider and deeper than the son's; as the boy put it to his father, "you see the big things". So the father, at a salary more than twice the size he ever earned before he went to College, becomes a member of his son's firm.

Two paragraphs of the story deserve quotation in full. One occurs in the first part of the story, where the author is describing the sacrifices the father and mother made with a view to sending the children to College (14):

Cousens was not academic about the project. He wished to give his children the benefit of his own experience, and the longer he lived in New York City the more keenly he felt the difference between those men whose lives were built upon the foundation of arts and letters and those whose lives were not. He knew the difference in his own life. If he had an intimate knowledge of that vast historical past to fall back on he would to-day have a better perspective. He would in a sense be the outgrowth of all that had gone before. Even those who had come away from college without much detail acquired this much. It was inevitable. Then, too, they acquired so much more than they realized.

The other occurs in the description of the visit of forty-year old Cousens to the College whence he had departed so abruptly in his Freshman year twenty odd years before. Cousens had stepped into a room to look over the Announcements of courses open in the University (158):

Hungrily Cousens ran through pamphlet after pamphlet—particularly those on history and English and philosophy. These were not to him mere courses of study; they were invitations to join the group of thinking men who see life steady and see it whole. They were opportunities for a man to link himself up with the past, to interpret the present and reach forward toward the future. Without an intelligent conception of what had gone before, a man to day was no more than a grubworm boring aimlessly in the unilluminated earth, feeding on mud, with all the glories of the world lying concealed above him. That was all he had been doing—feeding on mud that the world called money. And four short years would have given him all this—would have taken him out of the earth and given him wings. Then he could have grubbed safely, because it would have been a mere incident.

C. K.

## THE SENATUS CONSULTUM ULTIMUM<sup>1</sup>

On October 21, 63 B.C., the Senate passed the decree *consules videant ne quid detrimenti res publica capiat*, directed at Catiline. On November 8, Cicero delivered what is known as the First Oration against Catiline, threatening the enforcement of this decree. That night Catiline left the city. On December 3 the conspirators confessed to the Senate, and on December 5, after a debate in the Senate, the five who were in custody were executed in the Tullianum.

It is our task to determine Cicero's opinion of this decree (which, for convenience, I shall call the *Consultum*), and to ascertain the reasons for the long delay between the passage of the decree and the execution of

<sup>1</sup>This paper was read at the First Fall Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, held at the University of Pennsylvania, November 29, 1919.

the conspirators. I do not care to attempt the solution of what is probably an insoluble problem—the constitutionality of this decree<sup>2</sup>. If we accept as the Roman definition of unconstitutional the phrase *quod numquam antea factum est*, we shall see how easy it would be for a leader of either party in Rome to regard the measures of the opposition as unconstitutional. When the *de iure* popular sovereignty was reasserted against the *de facto* Senatorial government, popular leaders were certain to impeach as unconstitutional such devices as the dictatorship used to settle internal difficulties, and the Consultum.

But we are primarily interested in Cicero's own attitude, and on this point we can reach greater certainty. We may be sure that the Senatorial party in general would accept the description of the Consultum by Sallust (Cat. 29). According to him, it conferred upon the consuls, or other magistrates mentioned, the full *imperium*, without and within the city. It was, then, in effect a revival of the ancient dictatorship, and suspended the cherished right of *provocatio*. Cicero's theoretical position must have been very like this. In his defense of Rabirius, 2, he states that the real issue is the right to declare martial law, which the Senate claimed (*summum auxilium maiestatis atque imperi*). This makes it evident that he regarded the Consultum as one of those things that should be constitutional and legal because they were for the public interest (compare Phil. 11.28, where he approves certain acts of Cassius *quod Iuppiter ipse sanxit ut omnia quae rei publicae salutaria essent legitima et iusta haberentur*). This was also his opinion when he wrote, in Orator 102, *Ius omne retinendae maiestatis Rabiri causa continebatur*. He evidently regards the Consultum as a revival of the dictatorial power, as we see from the list of precedents which he cites in Cat. 1.3 ff.: (1) the killing of Ti. Gracchus by Scipio Nasica; (2) the killing of Sp. Maelius by Ahala; (3) the murder of C. Gracchus and Fulvius by Opimius; (4) the death of Saturninus and Glaucia at the hands of Marius and Valerius. The first is hardly a genuine precedent, as Nasica was a private citizen. The second was the act of a dictator, as Ahala was *magister equitum*. The case is emphasized by being put into a *praeteritio*, and, in De Sen. 56 and elsewhere, the act is spoken of with approval. The last two were certain cases of the Consultum, and Cicero might have added the decrees of 88 against Marius, of 82 against Sulla, and of 77 against Lepidus. A similar list is found in Pro Mil. 8, where Cicero states that the decree was enforced by Ahala, Nasica, Opimius, Marius, and the Senate *me consule*. I shall discuss this last phrase later. We may conclude, then, that Cicero believed the decree legal.

In the passage just quoted from the speech of November 8, Cicero contrasts with his own delay the immediate action taken by the other consuls who had been armed

with the decree. The essence of the Consultum was its authority to take immediate and drastic action. Yet the conspirators who finally suffered death were allowed to live until December 5. This in itself shows that, whatever Cicero's opinion was as to the legality of the decree, he was for some reason reluctant to draw the sword from its sheath. This calls for explanation. We are all aware of Cicero's dependence upon the favorable opinion of those around him, and of his sensitiveness to criticism. We remember, too, that he says frequently in the Orations against Catiline that there were men in Rome too stupid or too malicious to believe his charges against Catiline. 'You will live', he says to Catiline, 'as long as you have any defenders', which means that, as far as Cicero is concerned, Catiline may live forever. Here, then, is the first reason to believe that Cicero never did enforce the Consultum against Catiline: his reluctance to take any severe measures against him in the state of public opinion that then prevailed. It looks as if Cicero had tried to hold open for Catiline a means of escape, more for his own sake than for Catiline's. Up to December 3, Cicero was aware of the legal weakness of his position. He was afraid to act without convincing evidence, and with every moment of delay the value of the Consultum grew less. Cicero, furthermore, was a student of Roman history, and he knew that the popular party had never been thoroughly convinced of the legality of the decree. They had themselves used it against Sulla in 82, it is true, but the same weapons were used by both parties in many cases. In earlier days, the appointment of a dictator had been a regular method of the patricians when the plebeians annoyed them too much by agrarian proposals and by interference with the levies (compare Livy 3.2.1, etc.; 3.11.3, etc.). Yet its use in that way had always been opposed, until finally the institution was discarded altogether after 202. The popular attitude toward the Consultum was similar.

There was, in addition, another and special reason why Cicero distrusted the Consultum at this time. This was the trial of Rabirius, earlier in the year 63. With this in his mind, it was all the more necessary for Cicero to have what he lacked—a public sentiment that believed in the danger strongly enough to justify any method of dealing with it, however violent<sup>3</sup>.

I shall lay before you the facts, so far as they are known, and then attempt to interpret them (Heitland's excellent edition of the Pro Rabirio collects the ancient evidence. My interpretation, however, often differs from his). In the year 100, as I have already stated, the tribune Saturninus, the praetor Glaucia, and others were killed in Rome. At the time of the murder Saturninus had surrendered, and the murder was in effect a lynching and not an execution under the Consultum, but Cicero always gives Marius credit for having en-

<sup>2</sup>Cf. e. g. Abbott, *Roman Political Institutions*<sup>2</sup>, 240-243; G. W. Botsford, *Legality of the Trial and Condemnation of the Catilinarian Conspirators*, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 6.130-132.

<sup>3</sup>See the Orations against Catiline, *passim*. This point was emphasized in an unpublished paper entitled *The Declaration of Martial Law and the Conspiracy of Catiline*, read by one of my former students, Mr. D. D. Porter, at a meeting of The Classical Association of Pittsburgh and Vicinity, in 1915.

forced the decree, and this may be taken as the orthodox view of the matter (but compare Hardy, *Political and Legal Aspects of the Trial of Rabirius*, *Journal of Philology* [N. S.] 34.17, for an argument that in reality the trial of Rabirius has no direct bearing on the *Consultum*. Cicero thought that it did, and it is safe to follow him). A slave named Scaeva had been officially recognized as the murderer and had received his freedom in consequence. His claim had never been challenged. In the crowd that gathered around the murderer and his victim was a certain C. Rabirius. There was no evidence to show that he had had anything more to do with the murder than any other member of the mob, though he had shown an unseemly joy and had carried the victim's head around in a sort of triumphal procession (*Liber De Viris Illustribus* 73.12). Yet, in the year 63, 37 years after the death of Saturninus, this old and inconspicuous Senator was brought to trial on the charge, not merely of murder, but of treason! The accuser was T. Labienus, though, as antiquity rightly saw, the real prosecutor was Caesar. The very ancient (regal) institution of a trial before *duumvirs* was revived, which would carry with it the crucifixion of the defendant, if he should be convicted. By a strange coincidence, Caesar and his kinsman L. Caesar were chosen *duumvirs*. Cicero and Hortensius were advocates for the defence. Rabirius was of course convicted by the *duumvirs* and appealed to the *comitia centuriata*. There, despite the renown and the eloquence of his advocates, despite his almost certain innocence, he was about to be convicted, when the revival of another ancient custom saved him. When the *comitia centuriata* (originally the army) was in session, a red banner always waved over the *Janiculan* as a sign that the guard was on duty and that no attack threatened from the Etruscans. The lowering of the flag meant an attack, and caused the immediate adjournment of the Assembly to become an army. This custom, thanks to Roman conservatism in matters of etiquette, was still observed. When the vote was about to be taken, Metellus Celer had the flag pulled down, the Assembly adjourned, and was never reconvened for this purpose. By this ruse Rabirius escaped conviction<sup>4</sup>.

This curious procedure has been the subject of much discussion. Shuckburgh<sup>5</sup>, Mommsen<sup>6</sup>, Drumann<sup>7</sup>, Ferrero<sup>8</sup>, and others, without mentioning the *Consultum* directly, think of the trial as a warning or a challenge to the Senate, or as an attempt to make the conservatives obey the existing laws. Boissier thinks that both Caesar and Cicero were looking forward to the time when the *Consultum* would be used against Catiline<sup>9</sup>. I doubt this with respect to Cicero, though it may be true of Caesar, as I shall show later. Hardy thinks it was not a challenge of the *Consultum*, but merely a protest against the irregularities covered by that decree.

But Cicero, as we have seen, took it to be a challenge of the Senate's right to declare martial law, and we may accept his judgment.

It would be interesting to know why Caesar took this occasion to attack the *Consultum*. We do not know when Caesar abandoned Catiline, if he ever really supported him, but the whole democratic party was more or less engaged in Catiline's cause in the summer of 63, while, even if Caesar had no direct and immediate interest in Catiline, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have been glad to challenge the *Consultum*. It must have been fairly easy to surmise that sooner or later the decree would be used against the democrats, and in fact, it was so used, not only in 63, but again in 62, and this time, against Caesar himself. Perhaps Caesar did not want Catiline driven into open rebellion. I am inclined to believe that Caesar meant to say to the Senate, and particularly to Cicero, 'Allow yourselves no delusions; whatever you do in the case of Catiline, do not trust the *Consultum*'. We must admit, too, that Caesar's own position in 63 was far from secure. Caesar always showed for Cicero a peculiar consideration, based, no doubt, on genuine admiration and friendship. We may mention his invitation to join the *Triumvirate*, the offer of a position as *legatus* in Gaul, his desire for Cicero's cooperation in 49, and the safe-conduct after *Pharsalus*. It is not hard to believe that Caesar meant this as a friendly warning to Cicero. Such is the opinion of Hardy and Shuckburgh, among others, but their treatment of the case differs widely from mine. It was only after all other methods of getting Cicero out of Rome in 58 had failed that Caesar consented to the exile of the orator, and I can easily believe that Caesar would gladly have spared him that humiliation.

There may, of course, have been other purposes, such as the vindication of the sacrosanctity of the *tribunate*. This would explain why the death of Saturninus, and not that of Glaucia or the uncle of Labienus, was to be avenged. Both of these among others had fallen on the same occasion (compare also Professor Catharine Saunders, *The Consular Speeches of Cicero*, *The CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 10.154).

Why Rabirius was chosen as the victim, I can only conjecture. Suetonius (*Iul.* 12) accuses Caesar of *acerbilas* towards him, but it is hard to believe that he would have got off so easily if this had been true. There were other men still living who had been present or at least might have been present at the murder (*Pro C. Rab.* 21), but they were all men of much greater prominence than Rabirius, and correspondingly less useful to Caesar. Rabirius was inoffensive and insignificant. If by some accident he were convicted and exiled, little harm would be done. Something directed Caesar's attention to him: Caesar saw an opportunity to attack the *Consultum* and to assert the sanctity of the *tribunate*. Labienus had lost an uncle in the same affair. The old, harmless, and probably innocent Rabirius was the scapegoat. All the elements in a drama that might turn out either comedy or tragedy—

<sup>4</sup>The most complete account of the trial is found in Dio, 37.26 ff.

<sup>5</sup>History of Rome to the Battle of Actium, 697.

<sup>6</sup>History of Rome, Eng. trans., 4.459.

<sup>7</sup>Geschichte Roms, 3.162.

<sup>8</sup>Greatness and Decline of Rome, 1.264, and footnote.

<sup>9</sup>La Conjuration de Catilina, 105.

characters and plot—were at hand. The whole affair looks to me like a carefully stage-managed performance: the choice of a victim and of a crime to be avenged; the elaborate machinery; the ingenious device of getting Caesar chosen by lot as a duumvir; the conviction and the appeal; the suspiciously ready acquiescence in the escape of the defendant. In Ferrero's melodramatic words, 'Caesar was not thirsting for the life-blood of Rabirius'. But the evident desire of the comitia to convict Rabirius shows that the sentiment of the popular party was strongly against the Consultum, and that they would not view with equanimity a revival of its use. Such was the lesson that Cicero must have learned from the trial of Rabirius, in which he had played a conspicuous if unsuccessful part. Without this concrete evidence of popular opinion, Cicero might have put aside his constitutional fears, might have done without public opinion, but, with the spectacle of Rabirius before his eyes, he could hardly bring himself to the point of enforcing the Consultum. If we had as complete records of this year as we have of some others, in Cicero's Letters, I suspect that we should find in the Senate an element that was all the more intent on enforcing the decree because of the trial of Rabirius, an element that demanded drastic action because of, rather than in spite of, Caesar's challenge. Certainly we find such an element later, at the time of the trial of Clodius, and when the Asian tax-contract came up. Opposition would make them more enthusiastic than before. The trial of Rabirius showed that the leaders of the popular party could not be murdered with impunity under the guise of a declaration of martial law. Cicero's position was undoubtedly difficult, since he was hemmed in between a party that demanded action under the Consultum, and another party afraid, for various reasons, to act under it, reenforced by those who could not or would not see the danger. It is no wonder that Cicero failed, as long as he did, to act. And every moment that passed caused the edge of the Senate's authority to grow duller and duller. Cicero congratulates himself on the abdication of Lentulus, and with good reason. With equally good reason would he welcome any way of avoiding the enforcement of the Consultum.

Finally, however, on December 5, Cicero acted. The older opinion, still accepted by Professor Sihler (Cicero of Arpinum, 183), without discussion, was that Cicero did enforce the Consultum at that time. In recent years a number of variant opinions have been expressed. Professor F. F. Abbott, *The Classical Journal* 2.123 ff., has revived a view previously expressed with variations by Greenidge, Willems, and others, that Cicero regarded the Senate as a criminal court. Professor E. T. Merrill, *Cases of Treason in the Roman Commonwealth*, *Classical Philology* 13.46 ff., thinks that Cicero was trying to establish the principle that there might be a *iudicium senatus* comparable to the *iudicium populi*; he cites Cicero's words in *De Domo Sua*, 33: *sine iudicio senatus aut populi*. Willems, *Le Senat de la Republi-*

*que Romaine*, 2.283, and R. W. Husband, *The Prosecution of Catiline's Associates*, *The Classical Journal* 9.14 ff., think that the consul's assumed powers were due, not to the Consultum, but to a subsequent decree of a *tumultus*. Forsyth, *Life of Cicero*, 1.152, had already expressed the opinion that the consul abdicated his authority under the decree by appealing to the Senate and thus transferred the responsibility to them, and this view is mentioned with approval at least by the most recent biographer of Cicero (Hannis Taylor, *Cicero: A Sketch of his Life and Works*<sup>2</sup>, 183 ff.: Chicago, A. C. McClurg and Co., 1918). It seems likely that in some way Cicero was able later to make himself believe that he had shifted the responsibility to the Senate: see the sentence quoted above from *Pro Mil.* 8 and his words in *Phil.* 2.18, *comprehensio sententiae meae, animadversio senatus fuit*. I do not believe, however, that Cicero had any such idea at the time of the session on December 5. He did feel the need of the moral support of the Senate, and probably this was as far as Cicero had gone at that time. At the meeting on December 3, the Senate had done certain things that were its undoubted prerogatives, and other things that were less certainly its prerogatives. To the first group belong the vote of a *supplicatio* to Cicero and the votes of thanks to the other magistrates; also, less certainly, though probably, the vote of a reward to Volturcius. To the second group belongs the decision to give the conspirators into custody. The exact amount of pressure brought to bear on Lentulus to procure his resignation is not certain, and in consequence its classification is doubtful (see my paper, *A Note on the Tribune of Ti. Gracchus*, *The Classical Journal* 9.48, and the references there cited). As far as we know, no one had questioned the Senate's action in any of these cases. As the Senate had conducted this quasi-judicial investigation on December 3 without being challenged, Cicero determined to try it again on December 5, for the sake of the moral support he would gain. It is not clear to us and probably was not to Cicero that the Senate had any legal right to sit in judgment on the conspirators or on the evidence that convicted them. Cicero was acting 'by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'. He points out (*Cat.* 4.10) that those Senators who had voted in favor of the various motions on December 3 could not logically refuse to vote on December 5, and from a parliamentary standpoint his position is strong, though it fails to touch the real question, apparently raised by Caesar, regarding the rights of the conspirators under the Sempronian law (Cicero's answer in *Cat.* 4.10 is a quibble). Incidentally, it can not be assumed from this, as is sometimes done, that Caesar recognized the constitutionality of the Consultum by entering this debate. There was no time for lengthy debate on theory: action was necessary here. I know of no convincing evidence that on December 5 Cicero thought he was presiding over a court: his use of *referre* (*Cat.* 4.6) points rather the other way. Later, perhaps, there came to him the inspiration that the

Senate did or should have judicial competence (the earliest passage cited in favor of this theory is from an oration of 57, after his return from exile). If this was an afterthought, as I believe it was, Cicero was able to make himself, if not others, believe that he had acted on this principle all the time. Such afterthoughts are not unknown in Cicero's psychology. Like Tartarin, he possessed the faculty of converting what he wished he had done into what he had done. Unfortunately for Cicero, he could not shift the responsibility and the odium to the Senate; it was not the Senate, but Cicero, that suffered exile in 58<sup>10</sup>.

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### REVIEWS

A Latin Reader, with an Introduction to Roman History, Literature and Antiquities. By A. Petrie. Oxford: at the University Press (1918). Pp. 125; xi + 421. \$2.00.

This really remarkable Secondary School Latin Reader comes to us out of Africa; Mr. Petrie is Professor of Classics in Natal University College, at Pietermaritzburg. The volume consists of two separate works, the Introduction and the Reader, bound together. They must therefore be considered separately. The Introduction is a marvel of skilful condensation. The subject-matter, although the language of the statements is pared to the limit, is most interestingly presented. Imagine a real history of Rome—not a mere annalistic table—from the earliest times to the establishment of the Principate, in a form which any normal boy or girl will enjoy reading, contained in 58 pages! Then, in similar adequate and interesting fashion, in the remaining 67 pages are discussed The Roman Constitution, The Senate, The Comitia or Popular Assemblies, Roman Law and Law Courts, The Roman Army, Roman Private Life, Roman Religion, Roman Money, The Roman Calendar, The Latin Language, Latin Literature (the high lights from Livius Andronicus to Suetonius), writing and writing materials, book construction, publication, and selling, and the preservation of the classical authors. For all this matter there are excellent illustrations. Professor Petrie has beautifully accomplished the impossible.

The Reader is divided into a Junior Section (3-38) and a Senior Section (41-209), with no very sharp line of demarcation as regards the difficulty of the selections. The Reader is designed for students preparing for

examinations "in which no special text is prescribed for study", and it fulfills its purpose admirably. In the Junior Section we find, in order, selections from Nepos, some fairly easy episodes from the Gallic War (surprisingly brief, however, to us who are fed on Caesar), a number of passages from the simpler philosophic works of Cicero (though nothing from the Orations), a bit of Quintus Curtius, and ten of Phaedrus's fables. Nothing could better illustrate the difference of content between the British and the American curriculum of the earlier Secondary years.

In the Senior Section we have, as prose selections, somewhat more difficult Caesar (chiefly from the *De Bello Civili*), plenty of Cicero (Orations, Philosophy, Letters), a little of Sallust, considerable Livy, and some satisfying excerpts from Pliny the Younger. Then follows a very brief account of prosody as an introduction to the poetical selections. Catullus heads the list of poets, a rather unusual choice, as it seems. Then come about twenty pages of Vergil (little of the *Georgics* and much of the *Aeneid*); about as much of Horace as of Vergil (*Odes*, *Epodes*, and *Satires*); about a hundred lines each of Tibullus and Propertius; and, last of all, twenty pages again of Ovid (*Metamorphoses*, *Fasti*, *Tristia*).

The enumeration of these offerings has been somewhat particular in the belief that the value of a review of a book of selections depends largely upon giving a fair idea of the material offered. What a satisfaction it would be for Readers of the College Entrance Examination Board if the candidates for our own 'Comprehensive Examinations' would come up to them with a mastery of this material! On the other hand, pupils using any book of excerpts lack the advantage of connected reading of their authors and a fairly complete grasp of subject-matter. Extracts make for sketchiness rather than continuity. But, as good Sir Roger remarked in his famous adjudication, "There is much to be said on both sides".

The notes (211-340) may best be described as 'by an Englishman for English boys'. They deal with subject-matter, diction, and neat turns of phrase—with syntax not at all. But English pupils of this stage of advancement are presumed—and, I am told, justly so—to *know* their grammar! Why can we not do the thing with equal thoroughness on this side of the Atlantic? The fault, I think, lies largely in the American tradition of haste and short-cuts in the *multa sed non multum* of our educational faddists.

The vocabulary of all this range of material is necessarily much more extensive than our accepted American vocabulary of High School Latin. It is presented in the form of bare definition—always a grievous defect in any Vocabulary, however excellent the definitions may be from the point of view of diction in reference to usage in the text covered. In that regard, these are nearly perfect.

Finally, delightful as the book is, its atmosphere is English, its adaptation is English and its use will, I fear

<sup>10</sup>The bearing of the trial of Rabirius upon the conspiracy of Catiline and upon Cicero's conduct has never been fully appreciated and sufficiently emphasized. It is recognized as one of the various 'nibbling' attacks of the democrats on Cicero and the optimates (by Professor F. F. Abbott, *Titus Labienus*, *The Classical Journal* 13.4 ff.; compare Miss Saunders, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 10.153), but the direct connection is closer than is usually believed. The School editions usually fail to mention it at all, nor do they have satisfactory discussions of the *Consultum*. The effort to understand and explain to students the complicated politics of Cicero's administration is valuable in the teaching of Cicero and in the teaching of good citizenship (compare B. L. Ullman, *Political Questions Suggested by Cicero's Orations*, *University of Pittsburgh Bulletins*, Latin Series No. 3). A good political commentary on the Orations usually read would be useful.